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2Did You Happen to Notice that Lawrence v. Texas Overruled West Coast 
Hotel v. Parrish?
Even the most cautious commentators recognized that the Supreme Court did 
something other than simply find the lack of a rational basis for the Texas sodomy law 
which it declared unconstitutional in Lawrence v. Texas.1 Clearly, the Court moved 
liberty out of minimum scrutiny as an interest, and elevated it to an individually 
enforceable right.  At what level?  That seems to be what no one can figure out.  Of 
course, the problem with figuring it out is that commentators, litigants and the courts still 
link liberty to causes of action involving sexuality/the family.  The Court did not.  The 
Lawrence right to liberty is simply that: the right to liberty.  We don’t need to agree on 
the level of scrutiny it enjoys in every context, in order to realize that it is now a 
generally applicable right—that is, it trumps other concerns like, if not at the same level 
as, protected speech and freedom from an establishment of religion. 
 Part of the problem of understanding Lawrence is that we do not have a clear 
understanding of the doctrinal basis of minimum scrutiny.  For that, we need to re-
examine the case which articulated that basis and promulgated the scrutiny regime, West 
Coast Hotel v. Parrish.2 It has not been noted previously that the premise of West Coast 
Hotel is a “demotion” of liberty from an individually enforceable right to an interest, 
based on a highly dubious analysis of liberty from a Court frightened that it was about to 
lose power.  It is this “demotion” and this alone, which provides the basis for the scrutiny 
regime.  Thus, when the Court elevated scrutiny once again to an individually 
enforceable right in Lawrence, it overruled West Coast Hotel, the first time that had 
happened since the decision was issued in 1937.  Lawrence marks the beginning of the 
end of the scrutiny regime, something which, largely due to the regime’s incoherence but 
also due to the demand of public opinion, has been anticipated.  As one commentator has 
noted: 
 
At one point in its history American constitutional jurisprudence presumed that the distinction between 
“judicial” and “political” questions was intelligible; at another point it presumed that the boundary between 
public power and private rights could coherently be traced; at another it presumed that there was a clear 
difference between the sort of legislation that required heightened and the sort that only required minimal 
scrutiny.  Those presumptions did not come from the Constitution or any other legal source.  They came 
from a set of shared social and political attitudes that shaped conceptions of the role of the judiciary in 
American constitutionalism.  As those attitudes changed, presumptions changed with them.  A robust 
constitutional principle of departmental discretion gave way to judicial boundary tracing which gave way to 
judicially fashioned levels of scrutiny.  None of those regimes of constitutional interpretation should be 
regarded as cast in stone.  None should be regarded as intrinsically superior to the others.  The scrutiny 
regime has been with us for approximately 70 years.  It may have exhausted itself as a helpful technique of 
 
1 539 US 558 (2003). 
2 300 US 379 (1937). 
3constitutional interpretation.  If we understand its historical origins, perhaps we can understand its 
contingent status.3
The demise of the regime is well under way, even if we are in something of a quandary as 
to where that leaves us.4
West Coast Hotel sustained a state minimum wage law for women and minors.  In 
sustaining the law, the Court stated that “the Constitution does not recognize an absolute 
and uncontrollable liberty.  Liberty in each of its phases has its history and connotation.  
But the liberty safeguarded is liberty in a social organization which requires the 
protection of law against the evils which menace the health, safety, morals, and welfare 
of the people.  Liberty under the Constitution is thus necessarily subject to the restraints 
of due process, and regulation which is reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted 
in the interests of the community is due process.”5 The claimed authority for the law was 
merely that “the statute is a reasonable exercise of the police power of the state.”6
Nevertheless, the Court felt moved to assume, without deciding, that minimum wage 
laws were an aspect of due process and that due process conflicted with liberty.  It further 
assumed, again without deciding, that indicia of liberty are  
 
1.  absoluteness combined with uncontrollability; 
2.  “phases;”  
3.  “history and connotation;” and  
4.  “evils which menace the health, safety, morals, and welfare of the people.”   
 
Where it picked up these bizarre prejudices, no one knows.  Adept at describing liberty, 
the Court felt that the Constitution “does not recognize” liberty as a fact.  This 
nonrecognition was also the recognition of the Court’s new “liberty,” the indicia of which 
are 
 
1.  regulation  
2.  reasonably relating to  
3.  a subject.   
 
And what is the subject?  The same one the Constitution “does not recognize.”  Passing 
by this anomaly, we ask: for the fact of liberty, the Court substituted what fact?  The 
regime—the “social organization.”  That is what the Constitution recognized, again 
assuming it without defining it.  Where the Court picked up this additional bizarre 
prejudice, no one knows, either.  It is worth noting that the prejudice is a view of the 
Constitution as pre- or proscriptive, rather than descriptive.  It assumes, without deciding, 
that either liberty or due process is “subject” to the other and assigns the definition of 
“subject” to another term which is undefined, the “social organization.”   
Already, the Court has gone so far with unexamined assumptions and simple 
speculations that the decision would clearly not pass muster in today’s legal environment: 
 
3 G. Edward White, “Historicizing Judicial Scrutiny,” http://law.bepress.com/uvalwps/uva publiclaw/art31, 142. 
4 My own take on the level of scrutiny for liberty post-Lawrence, “The New Constitution: The Eminent Domain Revolt 
and Its Consequences,” http://ssrn.com/abstract=562521.
5 West Coast Hotel at 391.   
6 Id., at 389. 
4if it were not precedent, it would never be tolerated by anyone, it would be treated as a 
bad joke.  Politics has intervened to produce a wildly erratic holding.  It is ducking and 
shuffling by a Court on the run from Court-packing—it is nonsensical, evasive, bad faith.  
Among its other damaging assumptions is that prior to the vindication of the minimum 
wage law, liberty had somehow been an individually enforceable right.  This is another 
unstated assumption which is nowhere proved or even discussed, except in the context of 
the Court’s stated—and equally unsupported—assumptions about liberty.  The decision is 
an unholy mess.  Indeed, since there is no reasoned discussion by the Court of liberty in 
its pre-West Coast state, it is entirely unclear that West Coast “demoted” liberty in the 
first place or what the Court felt it was “demoting.”  But the Court later presumed that it 
was acting as if liberty had been “demoted.”     
What is important to note is that the “demotion”—or whatever the Court is 
doing—of liberty is the sole basis on which the Court sustains the minimum wage law 
and establishes the scrutiny regime. Viewed exclusively as a matter of legal technique, 
the most important aspect of West Coast Hotel is that by “demoting” liberty to an 
“interest,” the Court constructed for itself a “place” to put all facts with which its 
manifestly limited understanding made it incapable of coping; the history of the 
“minimum scrutiny” regime is the history of the Court’s progressive refusal to let anyone 
else deal with such facts, either.  For example, minimum scrutiny says that a law must 
have a rational relation to a legitimate public purpose, but the Court has famously said 
that the purpose needn’t exist in fact.7 Its absence as a fact could not be asserted against 
government’s invocation of minimum scrutiny.  Clearly, that idea was not going to be 
tolerable forever, especially given its glaringly problematic basis.       
Actually, the unspoken basis of West Coast Hotel was Marbury v. Madison,8
which was nowhere mentioned.  The law in question in Marbury—which might have 
permitted the Court to order the Executive to turn over a commission—was clearly 
unenforceable, not simply because the contemporary Administration might have refused, 
but also because future Administrations might refuse.  How does unenforceability play 
into West Coast Hotel? The West Coast Hotel Court overruled an earlier case, Adkins v. 
Children’s Hospital,9 in which minimum wage laws had been found unconstitutional.  
Adkins was from 1923; West Coast Hotel was from 1937.  What had happened in the 
interim?  Here the Court was at least frank:  “The importance of the question, in which 
many states having similar laws are concerned, the close division by which the decision 
in the Adkins Case was reached, and the economic conditions which have supervened, 
and in the light of which the reasonableness of the exercise of the protective power of the 
state must be considered, make it not only appropriate, but we think imperative, that in 
deciding the present case the subject should receive fresh consideration.”10 The ban on 
minimum wage laws had been ignored and would be ignored.  Adkins was flat out 
unenforceable.  Something was wrong with the Court’s jurisprudence when it issued 
decisions which could not, under any circumstances, be enforced.  This linked West 
Coast Hotel with Marbury, in which the Court also refused to go along with a law which 
could not, under any circumstances, be enforced. 
 
7 It need only be “conceivable.”  Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 US 229, 241 (1984). 
8 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).    
9 261 US 525 (1923). 
10 West Coast Hotel at 390. 
5The case of United States v. Carolene Products Co.,11 is famous for its footnote 
putatively exempting from the “minimum scrutiny” regime some facts in some contexts.  
But not liberty.  And yet Carolene Products itself gives the lie to that “exemption.”  
Carolene sustained a Federal policy preventing from interstate commerce, milk products 
with unwholesome substituted ingredients.  But the Court here does not apply minimum 
scrutiny analysis.  It treats as facts, “public health, morals, or welfare,”12 and sustains the 
law because it feels those are important facts, elevating them far above its own idea of 
minimum scrutiny.  As the Court notes, state law permitting the shipment of such 
products, was not based on any facts relating the products to the policy permitting the 
shipment of them; the Court didn’t care that there might be a state purpose.  The facts 
were that the products had “been stripped of elements essential to the maintenance of 
health….[The use of them] is generally injurious to health and facilitates fraud on the 
public,”13 the product marketed “in imitation or semblance of milk….”14 It has not been 
previously noted that the Court was able to intervene in this way because, in the first 
instance, in West Coast Hotel, its demotion of “liberty” was problematic.     
One famous tenet of Carolene is that government needn’t tailor its legislation 
precisely to facts.  The Court attempted to make precise this imprecision.  The Court said 
that “Appellee raises no valid objection to the present statute by arguing that its 
prohibition has not been extended to oleomargarine or other butter substitutes in which 
vegetable fats or oils are substituted for butter fat.  The Fifth Amendment has no equal 
protection clause, and even that of the Fourteenth, applicable only to the states, does not 
compel their Legislatures to prohibit all like evils, or none.  A Legislature may hit at an 
abuse which it has found, even though it has failed to strike at another.”15 But this 
allowance for legislative “discretion” was inherently contradictory.  On the one hand, “a 
statute would deny due process which precluded the disproof in judicial proceedings of 
all facts which would show or tend to show that a statute depriving the suitor of life, 
liberty, or property had a rational basis.”16 On the other, there “may be narrower scope 
for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face 
to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten 
Amendments” (this being the famous footnote).17 Since liberty had been “demoted” to 
minimum scrutiny, it was exempted from “narrower” operation—that is, the Court gave 
back to the political system that substituting of private for public purpose, which it 
seemed to have taken away.  So what were, in fact, “narrow,” “scope” and liberty?  If the 
facts of “public health, morals, or welfare” enjoyed more scrutiny under the rubric of 
liberty, as did all legislative policies relating to them, it was anomalous that liberty itself 
enjoyed only minimum scrutiny.  Thus, the Court itself began to force liberty once again 
to the surface—assuming, again, that it had ever submerged it.  And what, for that matter, 
were, in fact, private health, morals and welfare?   
More specifically, what was the relationship between liberty and “public morals?”  
It took a brief sixty after Carolene Products, but that precise question was finally posed 
 
11 304 US 144 (1938). 
12 Id., at 147. 
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6in Lawrence. The Lawrence case overturned Bowers v. Hardwick.18 In Bowers, the 
Court had sustained Georgia’s law against sodomy as applied to two consenting adult 
males.  What didn’t Georgia like about sodomy?   
 
1.  absoluteness combined with uncontrollability; 
 
It is sex, and any kind of sex: “any kind of private sexual conduct between consenting 
adults….”19 It’s also “painful.”20 
2.  “phases;”  
 
It both is and is not, sex: “facetious.”21 
3.  “history and connotation;”  
 
Georgia laws ban it and “have done so for a very long time.”22 
4.  and “evils which menace the health, safety, morals, and welfare of the people.”  
It provides “[n]o connection between family, marriage, or procreation….”23 
In short, Georgia didn’t like sodomy because, for Georgia, sodomy was liberty.  By the 
way, is it?  
The point is that, as we can see from the criteria above, Georgia’s criteria for 
liberty and its mandate regarding liberty came from the Supreme Court.  For the Supreme 
Court, too, sodomy was liberty, and therefore had to be suppressed.  The need for doing 
so “had [been] painfully demonstrated by the face-off between the Executive and the 
Court in the 1930’s.”24 This was Franklin Roosevelt’s threat to pack the Court with more 
justices in order to get New Deal legislation found constitutional.  And which branch of 
government, we ask, had suffered that pain?  The Supreme Court.  And how had the 
Court alleviated that curious pain?  By sustaining, in West Coast Hotel, a minimum wage 
law in a tradeoff for the right to suppress liberty: again, the criteria listed above. 
The law of privacy (one of those facts which the Court later felt should be exempt 
from the minimum scrutiny regime) is that it is an emanation of other Constitutional 
rights (the word “privacy” does not appear in the Constitution).  If nothing else, the 
Lawrence Court ended this vagueness, vagueness being the fault which, more than 
anything else, has threatened the gains made under the rubric “privacy.”  Lawrence 
finally makes it clear that, whatever else privacy may be, it is a factual inquiry into 
liberty.  Thus, it is untenable to read Lawrence as increasing the number of facts called 
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19 Id., at 191. 
20 Id., at 194. 
21 Id., at 194. 
22 Id., at 190. 
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7“privacy,” and so granting them strict scrutiny, while that for which they are indicia—
liberty—remains at minimum scrutiny.  This tension finally broke in favor of liberty. 
The Lawrence Court examined the facts as if liberty were a fact just like “public 
health, morals or welfare.”  Only, in this case, it found that the law didn’t jibe with 
liberty.  Among other things, as the Court noted, sodomy laws were unenforceable.  The 
Lawrence Court brought back into the Constitution precisely that which the West Coast 
Hotel Court had exiled from the Constitution: liberty.   
Perhaps it is giving the Court too much credit to say that, in West Coast Hotel, it 
did anything more recognizable than sustain a minimum wage law.  The West Coast 
Hotel holding cannot be said to rise to the level of an opinion.  It tilts at phantoms, most 
notably its bizarre notion of liberty, devoid of any reasoned conclusion.  Lawrence shows 
us that the scrutiny regime is so ill-founded, that we really have to go back to examine 
whether it has ever existed, ever been implemented, ever had any existence at all.  We 
don’t really know what predated it.  Nor do we know what will succeed it.  It is perhaps 
of a piece with the Court’s bizarre jurisprudence, that the Lawrence Court, dealing as it 
does with liberty, doesn’t even mention West Coast Hotel, although as we have seen, 
liberty is at the heart of the West Coast Hotel “holding.”  But when we do see the role of 
liberty in West Coast Hotel, and then see the role of liberty in Lawrence, we can at least 
say this: whatever West Coast Hotel held, Lawrence has overruled it. 
We live in a new era. 
 
